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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
-vs- Case No. 16420 
JOAN MARIE GORLICK, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
The state charged appellant with obtaining or 
exercising unauthorized control of another's ring, with a 
value exceeding $1,000, in violation of Utah ~ode Ann. 
§ 76-6-44. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The state tried appellant before a jury on January 
8 and 9, 1979, ~ith The Honorable,David B. Dee presiding. 
On January 9, 1979, the jury found appellant guilty of theft, 
a second-degree felony (R. 298). On March 23, 1979, Judge 
Dee sentenced appellant to imprisonment at the Utah State 
Prison for a term of one to fifteen years. Judge Dee 
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stayed execution of the term of imprisonment, contingent 
upon appellant successfully completing a two-year probationa: 
period, obtaining gainful employment during that period, 
and paying a $1,000 fine (R. 305-06). 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent seeks affirmance of the verdict and 
judgment of the district court. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On the afternoon of July 31, 1978, the victim, 
David Delgado, was sitting in the lounge at the Room at 
Top in the Hilto~ Hotel (R. 84). During that same afternoo: 
appellant, Joan Marie Gorlick, accompanied by Paul Tolman 
and Calvin Smith, entered the lounge and sat at another 
table (R. 84-85). Mr. Delgado subsequently joined appellar.~ 
and her companions at their table (R. 85). They stayed at 
the Hilton until about 10:30 p.m., each consuming several 
drinks (R. 86). 
Duirng the course of the evening, Mr. Delgado anc 
appellant negotiated over the purchase of appellant's gold 
necklace and Mr. Delgado's diamon~ ring (R. 87, 98-104). 
Appellant and Mr. Delgado could not agree on the value of 
the latter's ring. Their estimates ranged :rom 53'10 to S70C 
(R. 100). In fact, ~r. Milton PetersGn, a diamond salesmar 
and appraiser affiliated with a local diamond emporium, 
estimated the value of the rinc as Sl,250 to $1,400 on 
-2-
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August 1, 1978, the day of the theft (R. 127-29). 
Appellant wished to have the ring appraised. Mr. 
Delgado gave her possession of the ring to appraise while 
they were sitting at the table; he refused to let her take 
the ring home for appraisal (R. 104). 
About 10:30 p.m., Hr. Delgado wished to leave 
the Hilton and go to the Sun Tavern, which was located 
several blocks away. Appellant and her companions agreed 
to drive him there (R. 86). Mr. Delgado took possession of 
his ring from appellant (R. 114). At the Sun Tavern, each 
consumed several more drinks (R. 87). 
The negotiations over the jewelry continued at the 
Sun Tavern. Miss Jacquelyn JoKunst, a cocktail waitress 
at the Sun Tavern,observed r·'lr. Delgado displaying his 
diamond ring, while on his finger, to the appellant 
(R. 136, 137-38). 
h~ile Mr. Delgado was handing the ring across 
the table to appellant, he dropped it into a glass on the 
table (R. 114-15). Ao?ellant then drank the contents of the 
glass and allegedly swallowed the ring (R. 88, 115-16). 
~ Appellant refused to return the r~ng, claiming she had 
s~al~owed it (Id.). Mr. Delgado then called over Miss Kunst 
and told her that appellant had swallowed his ring and had 
refused to return it (R. 88). \\Then Miss Kunst asked appellant 
:: she had swallowed the ring, appellant, keeping her lips 
;::.rsed, nodded a~firmatively (R. 132). 
-3-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Mr. Delgado left the table, called the Salt Lake 
City Police Department, and wrote down the make and model 
and license plate number of appellant's automobile (R. 89). 
Mr. Delgado informed appellant that he had notified the 
police (Id.). She and her companions left and Mr. Delgado 
awaited the arrival of the police (Id.). 
Salt Lake City Police Officer George Kearns arrive: 
at the Sun Tavern in response to Mr. Delgado's complaint 
(R. 145). Subsequently, he located appellant and Mr. Calvi~ 
Smith sitting in her Lincoln Continental, w~~ch was parked 
in front of the Hilton Hotel, and which matched the descript: 
given to h1.rr, ny Mr. Delgado (R. 146-47, 149). Officer 
Kearns asked appellant for some identification. Her vehicle 
and her driver's license indicated that she was the person 
whom Mr. Delgado had complained had stolen his ring (R. 14/J 
Officer Kearns advised appellant of her ~iranda rights and 
then proceeded to interview her about Mr. Delgado's complai~: 
(R. 147-48). 
At first, appellant denied being at the Sun Taver~ 
that evening and knowing of Mr. D~lgado (R. 148, 228, 236, 
240-43). Mr. Smith also denied kno~ing Mr. Delgado or 
being at the Sun Tavern that evening (R. 254). of:icer 
Kearns then arrested appellant and placed her in the front 
seat of a police vehicle (R. 149). She then informed Of:'ice 
Kearns that she wished to talk about the incident. She 
-4-
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admitted being at the Sun Tavern with Mr. Delgado (R. 149). 
She then falsely told the officer that she had purchased 
the ring from Mr. Delgado for $300, and that it was in her 
purse (R. 150, 236-38). Officer Pat Smith, who had arrived 
to assist Officer Kearns, also interviewed the appellant. 
Appellant recited a third version about what occurred at 
the Sun Tavern. She told Officer Smith that she had 
pretended that she had swallowed the ring and that it was 
1n her purse on the seat of her vehicle (R. 264, 265, 266). 
Officer s~ith retrieved the purse and gave it to Officer 
Kearns (R. 264). 
Officer Kearns had also arrested Mr. Calvin 
Smith in connection with the theft of a second ring, which 
Mr. Delgado had falsely reported to the officer as belonging 
to him IR. 152, 166). Subsequently, Mr. Delgado notified 
Detective Gillies that the second ring belonged to Mr. 
Smith IR. 161). On August 31, 1978, the court dismissed 
the co~plaint against Mr. Smith (R. 3). 
On October 19, 1978, Judge Uno ordered appellant 
bound over to the district court ;or arraignment (R. 3). 
She was found guilty of second-degree theft by 
a jury or. January 9, 1979 (R. 298). 
and sentence of the district court. 
-5-
She appeals the verdict 
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APGUMENT 
POINT I. 
APPELLANT HAS FAILED TO SnClh' THAT 
THE JURY'S UNANI!10US VERDICT It\ 
FINDING DEFENDANT GUILTY OF THEFT 
IS UNSC:PPOPTED BY SUBSTANT:.:-.::.., 
EVIDE!KE h'EICH COULD COl\'YINCE 
REASONAB:::..E HINDS THAT SHE IS 
GUILTY BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT. 
Appellant contends that her conviction is 
unsupported by sufficient evidence. Her contention is :ounc; 
upon the allegations that the victim's testimony is unworthy 
of belief, that his testimony is uncorroborated, and that 
her multiple witnesses prc~e her innocence (Br. 9, 10, 12). 
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the 
verdict, State v. _cones, 554 P.2d 1321 (Utah, 1976), none 
of these co~tentions have merit. 
In State v. Romero, 554 P.2d 216 (Utah, 1976), 
the defenda~t appealed his conviction for burglary and 
theft, claiming there was insufficient evidence to uphold 
his conivction. He based his claim upon the fact that 
the witnesses could not identify all the co-defendants and 
gave conflicting testimony about the circumstances of the 
crime. This Court rejected his appeal and held: 
This court has lon~ upheld 
the standard that on an appeal from 
conviction the court cannot weigh 
the evidence nor say ;..•hat quantum is 
necessary to establish a fact beyond 
a reasonable doubt so long as the 
evidence given is substantial. Further, 
this court has maintained that its 
function is not to determine suilt or 
-6-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
innocence, the weight to give 
conflicting evidence, the credibility 
of witnesses, or the weight to be given 
defendant's testimony. 
Id. at 218 (citations omitted). 
This Court continued: 
This court has set the standard 
for determining sufficiency of 
evidence to require that it be so 
inconclusive or so inherently im-
probable that reasonable minds could 
not reasonably believe defendant 
committed a crime. Unless there is 
a clear showing of lack of evidence, 
the jury verdict will be upheld. 
Id. at 219 (citations omitted). Accord; State v. Mills, 
530 P.2d 1272 (\Jtah, 1975). 
As this Court outlined in State v. Sullivan, 6 Utah 2d 110, 
307 P. 2d 212 (1957), cert. den. 355 U.S. 848 (1957): 
But it is not sufficient 
merely that reasonable minds may have 
entertained such doubt (reasonable doubt). 
Before a verdict may be properly set aside, 
it must appear that the evidence was 
so inconclusive or unsatisfactory that 
reasonable minds acting fairly upon it 
must have entertained reasonable doubt 
that defendants co~itted the crime. 
Unless the evidence compels the con-
clusion as a matter of law, the verdict 
~ust stand. ~ 
307 P. 2d at 215 (emphasis in orioinal). 
The victim, Mr. Delgado, testified that he did 
not give appellant permission to take the ring with her 
(R. 104). He testified that apl)ellant allegedly swallowed his 
rinc; and refused to return it (R. 87, 89). .l\lthough appellant 
-7-
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and her companions gave testimony contrary to Mr. Delgado's, 
"the weight and credibility of the testimony of the victim 
was a matter for the jury." State v. Daniels, 584 P.2d 880, 
883 (Utah, 1978). See also: State v. Mills, ~· at 1273. 
Appellant's contention that Mr. Delgado's testimony 
was unworthy of belief because it is uncorroborated is 
frivolous. First, the fact that the victim's testimony 
is uncorroborated and con:licti~~ in some respects does not 
render such testimony insubstantial. State v. Middlestadt, 
57 9 P. 2d 9 0 8, 911 (Utah, 19 7 8) . Second, Mr. Delgado's 
testimony is corroborated by other ~itnesses and appellant'! 
admissions. Miss Kunst, the ~~itress at the Sun Tavern, 
asked appellant if she had swallowed the ring. Appellant, 
keeping her mouth clenched, nodded affirmatively in response 
(R. 132). After her arrest, appellant admitted to Officer 
Smith that she had pretended that she had swallowed the 
ring and that it was in her purse (R. 265). 
Appellant's contention that her "multiple ••itnesse: 
(Br. 12), she and her companions, undercut the prosecution': 
case is also meritless. The numbe;: o: witnesses for or 
against a particular proposition is irrelevant. :•loreover, 
appellant's testimony is subject to serious doubt. ~hen she 
was arrested, she lied to the arresting o:ficer. She statec 
that she did not know Mr. Delgado and that she hac not been 
-8-
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to the Sun Tavern that evening (R. 149, 157, 160). She 
subsequently changed her story and told the officer she had 
purchased the ring for $300 (R. 141, 255). In open court, 
she admitted that she had lied to the arresting officer 
(R. 129, 236-243). After she was placed in a police vehicle, 
she recited a third story that she had pretended to swallow 
the ring (R. 265). Her companion, Calvin Smith, who was 
simultaneously arrested with her, similarly denied his 
presence at the Sun Tavern that evening and the circumstances 
surrounding the ring (R. 256). 
The jury is justified in discounting her evidence 
and accepting the prosecution's. As this Court stated in 
State v. Schoenfield, 545 P.2d 193, 195 (Utah, 1976): 
In regard to defendant's contention 
that the evidence is not sufficient 
to justify his conviction, these ob-
servations are pertinent: the jury 
were not obligated to accept as true 
defendant's own version of the evidence 
nor his self-exculpating statements 
as to his intentions and his conduct. 
Thev were entitled to use their own 
judgment as to what evidence thev would 
believe and to draw any reasonable 
in!erences therefrom. 
I~ the instant case, appellant has failed to carry her burden 
in showing that the evidence is so insubstantial that 
reasonable rninds could not believe her guilty beyond a 
reasonatle doubt. State v. Daniels, supra, at 883; State v. 
l·:ilson, 565 P.2d 66, 68 (l'tah, 1977). The jury experienced 
-9-
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little difficulty in finding appellant guilty because it 
returned a unanimous verdict within several hours after 
beginning its deliberations (R. 298-300). Appellant has 
failed to demonstrate that reasonable minds must have 
entertained reasonable doubt about defendant's guilt. State 
v. Sullivan, supra. 
POI"JT II. 
APPELLAN':'' S Cot<DUCT PRESENTED THE 
JURY WITH SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE 
FROM l'ffiiC!'l IT COULD INFER THAT 
SHE OBTAINED THE VICTIM'S RING 
l·iiTH THE PURPOSE TO DEPRIVE HIM 
~HEREOF. 
Appellant's con~ention that the state failed to 
prove her crimlnal intent in taking the victim's ring is 
meritless. As this Court warned in State v. Canfield, 18 
Utah 2d 292, 422 P.2d 196 (1967): 
Defendant's case is presented in 
the all-too-common manner of defense 
counsel: arguing from his own theory 
of the evidence that it does not show 
the necessary intent to justify the 
verdict. But this is at variance with 
the correct pattern of procedure on 
appeal and paints quite a different 
picture of this case than we are ob-
liged to see. It is out duty to 
respect the prerogative of the Jury 
as the exclusive judses of the 
credibility of the witnesses and as 
the determiners of the facts. Con-
sequently, we assume that they believed 
the state's evidence, and we sur ·ey it, 
together with all fair inferenCE' that 
the jury could reasonablv draw thercfro~. 
in the light most favorable to their 
verdict. 
422 P.2d at 196. 
-10-
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Viewing the evidence presented at trial in the 
light most favorable to the verdict, including any reasonable 
inferences drawn therefrom, State v. Helm. 563 P.2d 794 
(Utah, 1977); State v. Canfield, supra, clearly the record contai~s 
substantial evidence from which the jury could infer 
aopellant took the ring with the requisite criminal intent. 
Appellant's conduct provides the clue to her intent. In 
State v. Hookins, 11 Utah 2d 486, 359 P.2d 486, this Court rejected 
the defendant's contention that the prosecution had not 
proven his intent to burglarize an apartment. The Court 
held: 
It is to be 
being a state of 
of direct proof. 
from conduct and 
in the light of 
remembered that intent, 
mind, is rarely susceptible 
But it can be inferred 
attendant circumstances 
human experience . 
359 P.2d at 487. Accord: State v. Romero, supra at 218 
("The intent to steal or unlav.'fully deprive the rightful 
owners of their property can be inferred by defendant's 
conduct and the attendant circumstances testified to by 
the Y:it~esses,"); State"~· Canfield, supra at 198 (". 
['·'] e are av.·are of no better nor f>ersuasive way to do it 
!prove what a man intended) than by showing both what he did 
and 1'hat he said . . "). 
The jury convicted appellant upon an information 
charinc her with theft, in violation of Utah Code Ann. 
/C-E-~'•<\ 11953), in that she "did obtain or exercise 
-11-
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unauthorized control over the property of David Delgado 
with the purpose to deprive the owner thereof (R. l3 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-401 (1953), defines the critical 
terms: 
* * * 
(2) "Obtain" means, in relation to 
property, to bring about a transfer 
of possession or of some other legally 
recognized interest in property, whether 
to the obtainor or another . 
(3) "Purpc=-= ~o deprive" means 
to have the coLs-~c~s objective: 
(a) To withhold property 
permanently or for so extended 
a period or to use under such 
circumstances that a substantial 
~ortion of its economic value, or 
~f the use and benefit thereof, 
would be los~. 
(c) To dispose of the 
property under circumstances 
that make it unlikely that the 
owner will recover it. 
(4) "Obtain or exercise unauthorized 
control" means, but is not necessarily 
limited to, conduct heretofore defined 
or known as common-law larceny by tres-
passory taking, larceny by conversion, 
larceny by bailee, and embezzlement. 
* * * 
The present theft statutes consolidate the common 
law crimes against property into a single offense--theft. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-403 (1953). This s-cz:tute further 
provides: 
-12-
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. An accusation of theft may 
be supported by evidence that it was 
committed in any manner specified in 
sections 76-6-404 through 76-6-410 . 
Under this section, any evidence establishing one of the 
comprised offenses supports a guilty verdict. State v. 
Tavlor, 570 P.2d 697 (Utah, 1977). 
The jury could reasonably believed that appellant's 
conduct demonstrated her intent to bring about a transfer 
of possession of the ring with the purpose to withhold it 
permanently or to dispose of it under circumstances that make 
it unlikely that Mr. Delgado could recover it. Mr. Delgado 
only gave her possession of the ring to appraise at the 
table (R. 90, 104). She "pretended" that she swallowed the 
ring and refused to return it to the victim (R. 87, 106, 
115-16, 132}, and then left the victim at the Sun Tavern 
after he ir.formed her that he had called the police (R. 106). 
\\hen the police subsequently confronted her at the Hilton, 
she at first told them she did not know Mr. Delgado and 
i(:nev; nothing about any ring (R. 148, 157, 160). Then she 
said she knew Mr. Delgado, but had purchased the ring for 
'> 
$300 IF. 149, 255). Her companion also denied acquaintance 
~lth Mr. Delgado, being at the Sun Tavern, and familiarity 
~ith the ring (F. 256). After the police arrested her, 
she finally told the truth that she had pretended that she had 
sv;alloY-·ed the ring (R. 265). She admitted these stories 
-13-
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during trial (R. 229, 236, 240-43). There was no close 
relationship between appellant and Mr. Delgado. They had 
met only briefly several times over the course of approxima~; 
six months (R. 93-94, 216-19). The victim was uneasy about 
letting her keep the ring on the table, let alone letting 
her keep it over night (R. 113-14). The victim mistrusted 
the appellant because of prior dealings regarding a job 
she had offered him (R. 96) 
The jury could properly convict her whether she 
formed the intent before she took possession of the ring 
or after, =F '~se to "obtain or exercise unauthorized contr:. 
comprehends common law larceny, embezzlement and the other 
offenses against property. Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-401(4) 
(1953). This Court re~ognized in State v. Bender, 581 P.2c 
1019' 1021 (1978)' [W] hen one has the intent to stea: 
the theft is completed at the time of asportation . 
The jury received substantial evidence to infer that appel:~ 
had the intent to steal at the time she took the ring with 
her when she left the Sun Tavern. 1·1hen appellant left the 
Sun Tavern with the ring, the victim was left only with the 
mere possibility that he might recover from a casual 
. 
acquaintance his valuable ring, a readily disposable item. 
Cf: State v. Bender, ~at 883 (". . e\·en i.f defenda;.: 
story that he only wanted the ve<icle for transportation to 
California were to be believed, it ~ould have = en only a 
-l~-
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possibility that Midvalley Auto would have recovered its 
stolen automobile in California"). 
POINT III. 
MARKET VALUE IS THE PROPER TEST 
FOR VALUING STOLEN PROPERTY IN ORDER 
TO DETERMINE THE DEGREE OF THE THEFT; 
AND THE JURY WAS GIVEN SUBSTANTIAL 
AND UNCONTRADICTED EVIDENCE THAT 
THE VALUE OF THE RING EXCEEDED $1,000 
AT THE TIME AND PLACE WHERE THE THEFT 
OCCURRED. 
In State v. Logan, 563 P.2d 811 (Utah, 1977), 
this Court set forth the standard for valuing property in 
the:t cases. In Logan, the defendant contended that 
replacement cost, not market value, was the proper test. 
This Court rejected his contentions and approved the trial 
court's instruction of value: 
. . . That value is the highest 
price, estimated in terms of money, 
for which the property would have sold 
in the open market at the time and in 
that locality if the owner was desirous 
o: selling, but under no urgent necessity 
of doing so, and if the buyer was 
desirous of buying but under no urgent 
necessity of so doing, and if seller 
had a reasonable time within which to 
find a purchaser, and the buyer had 
knowledge of the character of the 
property and of the uses to which it 
might be put. 
" 
Id. at 812-813. 
By this de:inition, the values discussed between the victim 
and the a~pellant are immaterial, for it is not the value of 
the item to a particular person, but the value commanded in 
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the open market. People v. Tillman, 59 Mich. App. 768, 
229 N.W.2d 922 (1975); State v. Armstrong, 361 S.W. 2d 811 
(Mo. 1962); People v. Lizar~aga, 122 Cal.App.2d 436, 264 
P.2d 953 (1954); Jewell v. State, 216 r1d. 110, 139 A.2d 707 
(1958). 
In the instant case, the prosecution produced Mr. 
Milton Petersen, a local diamond salesman and appraiser, 
qualified to give his expert ooinion about the value of 
diamonds (R. 124-25). He \·alued the ring on the day of the 
theft between $1,250 and $1,400 for a willing buyer and will~ 
seller, without either operating under any duress (R. 127-25 
He also ga''"' the Keystone value of the ring as being $500 
to $600. This value only attaches in situations where the 
buyer has very great buying power (R. 128), or the seller is 
in need of "quick cash," (R. 129). However, this Keystone 
value is not the proper standard for valuation, since it doe; 
not reflect the price between a willing buyer and a willing 
seller where neither is negotiating under duress, as require: 
under Logan, ~-
The jury properly inferred that Mr. Petersen's 
testimony related to the value of the ring in Salt Lake Cour· 
The call of the question related to the date of the offense 
(R. 127). Mr. Petersen was called as an expert familiar 
with the local market (R. 125). He referred to the price 
increases in the local diamond trade, based on the 
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fluctuations in the international money market (R. 127-28). 
The court's instructions directed the jury to find that 
the theft of the ring occurred in Salt Lake County (R. 32), 
and that its value on the date of the theft and at the 
situs of the theft occurred in Salt Lake County (R. 40). 
The appellant presented no evidence of a lower market value. 
"It is sufficient if the fair market value is established 
by expert testimony." People v. Lizarraga, supra, 264 P.2d 
at 954. Therefore, the jury could only infer that the value 
of the ring exceeded $1,000 on the date and at the place of 
the theft. 
CONCLUSION 
Appellant has failed to show that the jury's 
unanimous verdict is based on such insubstantial evidence 
that reasonable minds could not believe her guilty beyond 
a reasonable doubt. The weight and credibility of the 
witnesses were matters left solely to the jury as the 
triers of fact. The prosecution presented substantial 
evidence from which the jury could infer that appellant took 
the victim's ring ~ith the intent to deprive him thereof. 
The prosecution also presented expert testimony which 
~ 
placed the fair market value of the ring on the date of 
the offense as exceeding $1,000. She has not established 
the legal insufficiency of the jury's verdict; rather she 
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has presented her theory of the case, which the jury 
disbelieved. 
Therefore, the verdict and sentence must be 
affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
ROBERT B. HANSEN 
Attorney General 
1--"ILLIAM W. BARRETT 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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